IBPS SO English Language Paper Set for practice

Which of the following would be the THIRD sentence after rearrangement?

Which of the following would be the LAST (SIXTH) sentence after rearrangement? 

Which of the following would be the FOURTH sentence after rearrangement? 

Which of the following would be the FIFTH sentence after rearrangement? 

Which of the following would be the SECOND sentence after rearrangement? 

In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

Purists in Delhi, of course, will never stop grumbling. Their analytical clarity is uncluttered by the larger political and economic imperatives facing India’s foreign policy. Pragmatists, the few that there are in the capital, must adopt a different course. For one, they must concede publicly that (6) solutions to the problems of cross-border 7) with Pakistan are not on the (8). Until we get there, the pragmatics must affirm, India must responsibly (9) to reduce violence on the disputed borders and prevent the (10) of every military incident into a major bilateral crisis. Although the confidence-building measures can’t immediately address the “root causes” of the (11) with Pakistan and China, they expand the (12) between the Indian armed forces and those of Pakistan and China, create a measure of trust, and make it easier (13) a period of time to resolve the underlying conflicts. Having embarked on a substantive negotiation of military CBMs with Pakistan and China, the UPA government has some work to do at home. It needs to get the armed forces, the ministry of defence, the ministry of home and the foreign office to (14) the interconnected nature of India’s diplomatic objectives, military strategy and border management and ensure effective (15) between the different stakeholders. 

Purists in Delhi, of course, will never stop grumbling. Their analytical clarity is uncluttered by the larger political and economic imperatives facing India’s foreign policy. Pragmatists, the few that there are in the capital, must adopt a different course. For one, they must concede publicly that (6) solutions to the problems of cross-border 7) with Pakistan are not on the (8). Until we get there, the pragmatics must affirm, India must responsibly (9) to reduce violence on the disputed borders and prevent the (10) of every military incident into a major bilateral crisis. Although the confidence-building measures can’t immediately address the “root causes” of the (11) with Pakistan and China, they expand the (12) between the Indian armed forces and those of Pakistan and China, create a measure of trust, and make it easier (13) a period of time to resolve the underlying conflicts. Having embarked on a substantive negotiation of military CBMs with Pakistan and China, the UPA government has some work to do at home. It needs to get the armed forces, the ministry of defence, the ministry of home and the foreign office to (14) the interconnected nature of India’s diplomatic objectives, military strategy and border management and ensure effective (15) between the different stakeholders. 

Purists in Delhi, of course, will never stop grumbling. Their analytical clarity is uncluttered by the larger political and economic imperatives facing India’s foreign policy. Pragmatists, the few that there are in the capital, must adopt a different course. For one, they must concede publicly that (6) solutions to the problems of cross-border 7) with Pakistan are not on the (8). Until we get there, the pragmatics must affirm, India must responsibly (9) to reduce violence on the disputed borders and prevent the (10) of every military incident into a major bilateral crisis. Although the confidence-building measures can’t immediately address the “root causes” of the (11) with Pakistan and China, they expand the (12) between the Indian armed forces and those of Pakistan and China, create a measure of trust, and make it easier (13) a period of time to resolve the underlying conflicts. Having embarked on a substantive negotiation of military CBMs with Pakistan and China, the UPA government has some work to do at home. It needs to get the armed forces, the ministry of defence, the ministry of home and the foreign office to (14) the interconnected nature of India’s diplomatic objectives, military strategy and border management and ensure effective (15) between the different stakeholders. 

Purists in Delhi, of course, will never stop grumbling. Their analytical clarity is uncluttered by the larger political and economic imperatives facing India’s foreign policy. Pragmatists, the few that there are in the capital, must adopt a different course. For one, they must concede publicly that (6) solutions to the problems of cross-border 7) with Pakistan are not on the (8). Until we get there, the pragmatics must affirm, India must responsibly (9) to reduce violence on the disputed borders and prevent the (10) of every military incident into a major bilateral crisis. Although the confidence-building measures can’t immediately address the “root causes” of the (11) with Pakistan and China, they expand the (12) between the Indian armed forces and those of Pakistan and China, create a measure of trust, and make it easier (13) a period of time to resolve the underlying conflicts. Having embarked on a substantive negotiation of military CBMs with Pakistan and China, the UPA government has some work to do at home. It needs to get the armed forces, the ministry of defence, the ministry of home and the foreign office to (14) the interconnected nature of India’s diplomatic objectives, military strategy and border management and ensure effective (15) between the different stakeholders. 

Purists in Delhi, of course, will never stop grumbling. Their analytical clarity is uncluttered by the larger political and economic imperatives facing India’s foreign policy. Pragmatists, the few that there are in the capital, must adopt a different course. For one, they must concede publicly that (6) solutions to the problems of cross-border 7) with Pakistan are not on the (8). Until we get there, the pragmatics must affirm, India must responsibly (9) to reduce violence on the disputed borders and prevent the (10) of every military incident into a major bilateral crisis. Although the confidence-building measures can’t immediately address the “root causes” of the (11) with Pakistan and China, they expand the (12) between the Indian armed forces and those of Pakistan and China, create a measure of trust, and make it easier (13) a period of time to resolve the underlying conflicts. Having embarked on a substantive negotiation of military CBMs with Pakistan and China, the UPA government has some work to do at home. It needs to get the armed forces, the ministry of defence, the ministry of home and the foreign office to (14) the interconnected nature of India’s diplomatic objectives, military strategy and border management and ensure effective (15) between the different stakeholders. 

Purists in Delhi, of course, will never stop grumbling. Their analytical clarity is uncluttered by the larger political and economic imperatives facing India’s foreign policy. Pragmatists, the few that there are in the capital, must adopt a different course. For one, they must concede publicly that (6) solutions to the problems of cross-border 7) with Pakistan are not on the (8). Until we get there, the pragmatics must affirm, India must responsibly (9) to reduce violence on the disputed borders and prevent the (10) of every military incident into a major bilateral crisis. Although the confidence-building measures can’t immediately address the “root causes” of the (11) with Pakistan and China, they expand the (12) between the Indian armed forces and those of Pakistan and China, create a measure of trust, and make it easier (13) a period of time to resolve the underlying conflicts. Having embarked on a substantive negotiation of military CBMs with Pakistan and China, the UPA government has some work to do at home. It needs to get the armed forces, the ministry of defence, the ministry of home and the foreign office to (14) the interconnected nature of India’s diplomatic objectives, military strategy and border management and ensure effective (15) between the different stakeholders. 

Purists in Delhi, of course, will never stop grumbling. Their analytical clarity is uncluttered by the larger political and economic imperatives facing India’s foreign policy. Pragmatists, the few that there are in the capital, must adopt a different course. For one, they must concede publicly that (6) solutions to the problems of cross-border 7) with Pakistan are not on the (8). Until we get there, the pragmatics must affirm, India must responsibly (9) to reduce violence on the disputed borders and prevent the (10) of every military incident into a major bilateral crisis. Although the confidence-building measures can’t immediately address the “root causes” of the (11) with Pakistan and China, they expand the (12) between the Indian armed forces and those of Pakistan and China, create a measure of trust, and make it easier (13) a period of time to resolve the underlying conflicts. Having embarked on a substantive negotiation of military CBMs with Pakistan and China, the UPA government has some work to do at home. It needs to get the armed forces, the ministry of defence, the ministry of home and the foreign office to (14) the interconnected nature of India’s diplomatic objectives, military strategy and border management and ensure effective (15) between the different stakeholders. 

Purists in Delhi, of course, will never stop grumbling. Their analytical clarity is uncluttered by the larger political and economic imperatives facing India’s foreign policy. Pragmatists, the few that there are in the capital, must adopt a different course. For one, they must concede publicly that (6) solutions to the problems of cross-border 7) with Pakistan are not on the (8). Until we get there, the pragmatics must affirm, India must responsibly (9) to reduce violence on the disputed borders and prevent the (10) of every military incident into a major bilateral crisis. Although the confidence-building measures can’t immediately address the “root causes” of the (11) with Pakistan and China, they expand the (12) between the Indian armed forces and those of Pakistan and China, create a measure of trust, and make it easier (13) a period of time to resolve the underlying conflicts. Having embarked on a substantive negotiation of military CBMs with Pakistan and China, the UPA government has some work to do at home. It needs to get the armed forces, the ministry of defence, the ministry of home and the foreign office to (14) the interconnected nature of India’s diplomatic objectives, military strategy and border management and ensure effective (15) between the different stakeholders. 

Purists in Delhi, of course, will never stop grumbling. Their analytical clarity is uncluttered by the larger political and economic imperatives facing India’s foreign policy. Pragmatists, the few that there are in the capital, must adopt a different course. For one, they must concede publicly that (6) solutions to the problems of cross-border 7) with Pakistan are not on the (8). Until we get there, the pragmatics must affirm, India must responsibly (9) to reduce violence on the disputed borders and prevent the (10) of every military incident into a major bilateral crisis. Although the confidence-building measures can’t immediately address the “root causes” of the (11) with Pakistan and China, they expand the (12) between the Indian armed forces and those of Pakistan and China, create a measure of trust, and make it easier (13) a period of time to resolve the underlying conflicts. Having embarked on a substantive negotiation of military CBMs with Pakistan and China, the UPA government has some work to do at home. It needs to get the armed forces, the ministry of defence, the ministry of home and the foreign office to (14) the interconnected nature of India’s diplomatic objectives, military strategy and border management and ensure effective (15) between the different stakeholders. 

Purists in Delhi, of course, will never stop grumbling. Their analytical clarity is uncluttered by the larger political and economic imperatives facing India’s foreign policy. Pragmatists, the few that there are in the capital, must adopt a different course. For one, they must concede publicly that (6) solutions to the problems of cross-border 7) with Pakistan are not on the (8). Until we get there, the pragmatics must affirm, India must responsibly (9) to reduce violence on the disputed borders and prevent the (10) of every military incident into a major bilateral crisis. Although the confidence-building measures can’t immediately address the “root causes” of the (11) with Pakistan and China, they expand the (12) between the Indian armed forces and those of Pakistan and China, create a measure of trust, and make it easier (13) a period of time to resolve the underlying conflicts. Having embarked on a substantive negotiation of military CBMs with Pakistan and China, the UPA government has some work to do at home. It needs to get the armed forces, the ministry of defence, the ministry of home and the

Purists in Delhi, of course, will never stop grumbling. Their analytical clarity is uncluttered by the larger political and economic imperatives facing India’s foreign policy. Pragmatists, the few that there are in the capital, must adopt a different course. For one, they must concede publicly that (6) solutions to the problems of cross-border 7) with Pakistan are not on the (8). Until we get there, the pragmatics must affirm, India must responsibly (9) to reduce violence on the disputed borders and prevent the (10) of every military incident into a major bilateral crisis. Although the confidence-building measures can’t immediately address the “root causes” of the (11) with Pakistan and China, they expand the (12) between the Indian armed forces and those of Pakistan and China, create a measure of trust, and make it easier (13) a period of time to resolve the underlying conflicts. Having embarked on a substantive negotiation of military CBMs with Pakistan and China, the UPA government has some work to do at home. It needs to get the armed forces, the ministry of defence, the ministry of home and the